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The Deregulation of New Zealand
Agriculture: Market Intervention
(1964-84) and Free Market
Readjustment (1984-90)
Warren E. Johnston and Gerald A. G. Frengley
The impacts of deregulation on New Zealand's agricultural sector are examined.
Economic liberalization of all sectors of economic activity is the hallmark of current
economic policy designs in New Zealand. This is in sharp contrast to previous policies
reliant on massive government assistance to and intervention in agriculture. The
study provides insights into the cumulative and distortionary extent of previous
assistance policies, discusses the rationale in removing public financial assistance, and
reviews the readjustment process. As a case study, New Zealand's experience reveals
difficulties which may confront farmers in other economies where policy makers seek
a return to free market conditions.
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Economic policy observers ponder the efficacy
of making gradual and incremental changes in
the policy mix versus a strategy of more sud-
den abrupt change with little adjustment as-
sistance to those affected. These were the al-
ternatives which confronted the New Zealand
government in the mid-1980s when it became
evident that social assistance economic poli-
cies, for which the country had been well known
during the post-World War II period, had both
distorted economic sector performances and
imposed unacceptably expensive support costs.
A revision of the agricultural support policy
was underway in 1983 under the then National
government, but in 1984 a Labour government
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was elected and subsequently promoted a new
economic philosophy. The economic environ-
ment changed radically at that time from one
which had become progressively reliant on
massive government assistance and interven-
tion to one of clearer market orientation, seek-
ing more efficient use of resources throughout
the economy. While the thrust of New Zea-
land's new policy of"economic liberalization"
is economy wide, this article seeks only to de-
scribe the post-World War II swings in policies
affecting agriculture and the extent to which
the sector has, or has not, adjusted to the new
economic environment.'
The Post-War Economy
The New Zealand economy was a small, rel-
atively rich economy in the 1950s when, to-
gether with Switzerland, it had the third high-
est per capita GNP in the world. The economy
was characterized as having a leading agricul-
'Readers interested in macroeconomic or economy-wide per-
spectives should refer to Reynolds, Chiao, and Robinson or to
several appropriate chapters in Sandrey and Reynolds.
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turally based export sector and a small, but
highly protected, import substitution manu-
facturing sector. Pastoral based commodi-
ties-dairy products, meat, and wool-domi-
nated exports.
Economic changes in subsequent years
proved adverse to maintaining the standard of
living, following loss of"favored status" in the
United Kingdom market through UK entry
into the Common Market and increased in-
ternational protectionism for pastoral prod-
ucts (Dickinson). It became increasingly dif-
ficult to shelter the small economy from
external forces, including those of increased
international interdependencies in commodity
and capital markets. As a consequence, the
standard of living could not be supported by
government actions over the longer run and,
by 1987, New Zealand's per capita income had
fallen to about a third of the per capita income
of Switzerland (World Bank).
Agricultural Policy Environments
through 1984
The Early Impetus for Assistance
The earlier prosperity was largely attributable
to agricultural exports which had provided
more than 90% of all export earnings. Real
agricultural prices fell through the 1950s, and
by the end of the decade serious concern about
balance of payments drew the attention of pol-
icy makers (Philpott). Decisions were made to
"assist" agricultural output expansion because
pastoral agriculture was seen to have signifi-
cant potential to increase production (Levy).
Agricultural Production Targets
During the 1960s, the decline in agricultural
commodity prices accelerated, accentuated by
increasingly protectionist policies in major
markets for pastoral products. New Zealand
failed to accept these as long-term trends, re-
garding them instead as short-term cycles which
might be buffered by policies of government
intervention. The perceived need was to in-
crease agricultural output. Ten-year output
targets for meat, wool, and dairy were estab-
lished by the Agricultural Development Con-
ference (ADC) in 1963, with the goal of achiev-
ing export levels required to "maintain a
reasonable rate of growth in the economy."
At the time, government intervention was
limited to indicative planning for the agricul-
tural sector and to the provision of sufficient
resources for growth in output. A required live-
stock increase of 3.5% per year was set in order
to reach the target of 111 million livestock
"ewe equivalents" by 1972. The livestock tar-
get was seen as achievable by the farming com-
munity, and the desired rate of growth was
achieved through the 1967-68 season. How-
ever, farmer confidence was subsequently af-
fected by financial reversals because of infla-
tion-induced cost increases, falling wool prices,
and drought during the 1968-69 production
season. Output increases were arrested and
stock numbers did not change appreciably for
nearly a decade thereafter.
Increased Market Intervention
The 1970s can be characterized as the decade
in which a variety of incremental policies were
called forth in efforts to revitalize growth. In-
creased funding for extension, research, and
quality control was followed by tax incentives
to increase stock numbers, by increases in fer-
tilizer subsidies, and by price stabilization pol-
icies which included heavily subsidized loans
to producer boards. Despite these efforts, live-
stock numbers increased only slightly from
1968 through the end of the 1979 production
season.
The 1978-79 season was a crucial year for
agricultural policy change. Supplementary
Minimum Price (SMP) payments were intro-
duced to provide confidence to producers in
boosting output. Input costs were further sub-
sidized in an effort to offset high internal costs
of protected industries, costs of imported in-
puts, and rising inflation. In addition, conces-
sional financing for farm development in-
creased and expansion activities and further
taxation incentives (including loan forgive-
ness) were adopted as measures to stimulate
output expansion. Agricultural assistance con-
tinued to grow through the early 1980s despite
declining terms of trade for agriculture and
rising real interest rates worldwide. Real fac-
tor/product price ratios were obscured by the
variety of assistance measures, and investment
and output performances of the pastoral sector
responded to distorted price signals induced
by the policies.
Successive New Zealand governments pur-
sued protection and exchange rate policies
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which both reduced farmers' returns in do-
mestic currency terms and increased farm costs.
Le Heron (1989a, b) provides a useful chron-
icle of political goals and forms of government
interventions that were present through the pe-
riod 1960 to 1984. Assistance measures re-
quired to maintain agricultural viability and
export production for foreign exchange were
pervasive. The mixture of subsidized farm in-
puts, farm outputs, agricultural services, and
borrowed capital had side effects resulting in-
evitably in the introduction of further mea-
sures with their own side effects (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development).
The fiscal deficit grew as a percentage of gross
domestic product, with large increases in for-
eign debt. By the mid-1980s, New Zealand's
per capita GNP had slipped to 25th in the
world.
Costs of Market Intervention and the
Need for Economic Policy Reform for
New Zealand Agriculture
Government assistance had progressed through
three phases: first, the indicative planning phase
accompanied by assurance of adequate re-
sources (1962-72); second, price and capital
subsidies to mitigate rising input costs (1972-
79); and third, direct output commodity price
support (1979-84). By 1984, there was na-
tionwide recognition of increased levels of fis-
cal deficit and overseas debt. Restrictive mon-
etary policies and capital rationing had resulted
in high rates of interest, and massive levels of
financial assistance given to agriculture (and
to other economic sectors) were identified as
contributors to the nation's adverse economic
outlook.
In June 1984 the National government,
which had drifted into interventionism and
elector disenchantment resulting from those
policies, announced the termination of the SMP
scheme and the decision to revert charges for
producer board accounts at the Reserve Bank
to commercial interest rates. A snap election
in July 1984 brought the Labour party into
power. The new government emphasized
monetary and fiscal policies aimed at reducing
the inflation rate 2 and promised economic re-
2 Inflation had been at double-digit levels for all but one year in
the preceding decade.
forms designed to improve resource efficien-
cies in all sectors of the economy. 3 The agri-
cultural sector was to be fully exposed to world
market conditions.
Cost of Market Intervention
The withdrawal of financial assistance to pas-
toral agriculture was not immediate although
the policy intent was clear. The cost of financial
assistance to pastoral agriculture over the pe-
riod 1979-80 through 1985-86 was about $5.7
billion, of which $5 billion (87%) was expend-
ed in the last five years of the period [Johnston
and Sandrey 1989; Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAF)]. Nearly half of the sum (48%)
was spent on SMP payments and price stabi-
lization support through producer boards.
These payments provided output price sup-
port to reduce producer risk for investments
in increased output. The majority (93%) of the
SMP assistance went to lamb, mutton, and
wool producers (Griffith and Grundy).
Capital concessions (interest rates, debt
write-off, and special taxation exemptions) ac-
counted for 26%. In the last three years ending
in 1984, mortgage rates charged Rural Bank
borrowers were at least 5% below commercial
mortgage rates (Johnston and Sandrey 1990).
Off-farm assistance amounted to 17%, and in-
put cost subsidies were 9% of financial assis-
tance. The compound effect of the policy mix
along with government assurances encouraged
borrowing in an environment in which there
was increased competition for land and con-
fused measures of real farm profitability and
equity.
The New Economic Environment
The newly elected Labour party (July 1984)
immediately announced a 20% devaluation of
the New Zealand dollar and removed controls
on lending and deposit interest rates. It then
3 The Labour party was moved to adopt a free market orientation
by its Finance Minister (Roger Douglas) setting it, a "liberal" party,
in an odd juxtaposition with its predecessor National party, sup-
posedly the more conservative of the two. The National party's
role in progressive intervention and assistance over the 1970s and
early 1980s served, oddly enough, to place it, with respect to many
economic policies, to the left of its opponent. The policy void was
to the right, and Douglas committed the Labour party to view its
policy package of restructuring agricultural assistance through that
"window ofopportunity" created in part by the forced devaluation.
The cost savings and efficiency gains were expected to assist the
funding of the social reforms.
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followed with a November 1984 budget which
removed various subsidies and incentives, in-
cluding a phasing out of fertilizer subsidies,
raising Rural Bank interest rates progressively
to the market rate, lowering irrigation and wa-
ter supply subsidies, terminating the invest-
ment tax allowance, ending the noxious weeds
subsidy, and introducing a cost recovery
program for product inspection services
(Reynolds, Chiao, and Robinson). Subsequent
policies would transfer Crown assets to profit-
motivated State Owned Enterprises; phase out
land development tax concessions; introduce
a flat consumption tax on goods and services;
initiate cost recovery for advisory, research,
animal health, and agricultural quarantine ser-
vices; reduce grants and subsidies to agricul-
tural organizations; remove producer board
access to Reserve Bank finance; and, in gen-
eral, move towards eradicating government in-
tervention via financial assistance, regulation,
or government ownership of enterprises (John-
ston and Sandrey 1989). The latter included
the sale of irrigation projects and government-
owned financial institutions.
Assistance reform immediately stripped
away much of agriculture's protection relative
to other sectors while monetary and fiscal pol-
icies continued to impose costs on the sector
through high interest and exchange rates. Ini-
tially the economic reforms had the support
of the agricultural sector. The withdrawal of
assistance to agriculture and other sectors of
the economy was greeted with expectations that
exchange rate changes would reflect more fa-
vorable on-farm terms of trade, remove off-
farm cost excesses, and level the "playing field."
Farm incomes fell with the removal of assis-
tance, but off-farm cost excesses did not re-
spond as quickly. Further, the removal of in-
terest rate controls and the appreciation of the
New Zealand dollar adversely affected agri-
culture's exporting sectors after it was floated.
For many, the adjustment process has been
painful with reduced incomes and reduced lev-
els of production and investment accompa-
nied by rising debt servicing costs and shrink-
ing asset values.
Economic Performance During the Eighties
Table 1 contains selected economic informa-
tion about New Zealand agriculture during the
1980s. Total agricultural output rose consid-
erably in the first year of policy change (during
the 1984-85 season) in part because of a short-
lived favorable movement in the exchange rate
and the announced termination of price sup-
port measures for the following season. The
value of agricultural output subsequently fell
due to combined effects of low prices and re-
duced outputs, but it has since risen slowly in
nominal terms to $9.9 billion. In real terms,
agricultural output is still lower than levels ob-
served during the first half of the 1980s.
While agriculture continues to be the na-
tion's major exporting sector bringing in about
60% of total export receipts in 1988 (Sandrey
and Reynolds), agriculture's share of gross do-
mestic product fell through much of the 1980s.
Total assistance to pastoral agriculture in-
creased substantially from only $23 million in
1970 and $233 million in 1975, rising signif-
icantly to almost $1.2 billion (a third of the
value of pastoral agricultural output) in 1983.
The major assistance measures were supple-
mentary minimum prices, producer board
subsidies, and interest and tax concessions.
Deregulation occurred during 1985. Total as-
sistance was not withdrawn immediately, but
it did fall by half within two years. Current
levels of direct assistance to pastoral agricul-
ture are low and will decline further. Total
assistance as a percent of output and the ef-
fective rate of assistance (ERA), a comparative
measure of protection and assistance given to
other sectors of the economy, both peaked in
1983 and subsequently have fallen rapidly.
Pastoral agriculture is now at a net disadvan-
tage to the other sectors; in effect, it no longer
receives net assistance, but is now "taxed" rel-
ative to nonfarm sectors.4
Consumer prices doubled in the first six years
of the decade. The rate of inflation has mod-
erated since 1988. The real trade-weighted ex-
change rate, expected by farmers to swing in
their favor as a consequence of changes in eco-
nomic policies, was stable for most of the early
period, except for favorable gains in 1985
largely in response to the devaluation against
the U.S. dollar. More recently, the index has
deteriorated beyond prereform levels. Real net
farm incomes for sheep and beef farms de-
clined throughout the decade, except for the
4 A negative ERA indicates that cost excesses (protection) else-
where within the economy for inputs and manufactured goods used
by agriculture exceed total assistance to the sector (Tyler and Lat-
timore).
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Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators, New Zealand, 1980-90
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Total Ag Output ($ billion) 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.9 7.6 6.9 6.9 7.6 8.3 9.9
Real 1976 dollars (billion) 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0
Agriculture Percent of GDP 10.1 8.8 7.7 6.7 7.0 9.2 7.0 5.9 6.0 5.9 6.9
Total Assistance to Pastoral
Agriculture ($ million) 393 345 750 1,179 1,092 1,060 874 525 558 287 209
As a Percentage of Output 15 13 24 33 30 23 23 13 12 5 3
Effective Rate of Assis-
tance 12 3 49 123 99 40 34 19 15 -1 -6
Consumer Price Index (1976
= 1,000) 1,705 1,973 2,289 2,589 2,700 3,016 3,426 3,998 4,410 4,622 4,898
Real Trade-Weighted Ex-
change Rate (1976 =
1,000) 1,039 1,023 1,012 1,016 1,004 867 1,024 1,022 1,237 1,171 1,229
Real Net Farm Income Indices
Sheep and Beef Farms
(1975-76 = 1,000) 1,066 807 686 663 503 832 329 475 474 440 433
Dairy Farms (1975-76 =
1,000) 839 797 905 837 838 969 723 592 610 997 1,308
Farmland Values ($/hectare)a 1,395 2,008 2,941 3,128 2,957 3,085 2,793 2,462 2,390 2,508 -
Real 1976 dollars per hect-
areb 818 1,018 1,284 1,208 1,095 1,023 815 616 542 569 -
Real Net Worth of Sheep
and Beef Farms Index
(1975-76 = 1,000) 1,285 1,423 1,378 1,120 1,117 883 531 524 445 430 448
Agricultural Debt ($ billion) 3.5 4.2 5.2 5.8 6.8 7.4 8.0 8.5 8.0 7.8 -
Sources: Johnston and Sandrey (1989); Sandrey and Reynolds; New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service (various issues
of the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey, 1989, 1990b); Department of Statistics; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries;
Valuation New Zealand.
Note: Data are annual, some of which are calendar year, some government fiscal year ending 31 March, and some production year
ending 30 June. 1988-90 figures are either provisional or forecasts.
a Average price of all freehold farmland sold on the open market.
b Real price per hectare on sales adjusted for quality, size, mix, and types of sales.
upward surge in 1985. In contrast, real net
farm incomes for dairy farms, also an impor-
tant component of the pastoral sector, did not
fall as drastically.
Farmland values for freehold farmland sold
on the open market increased through 1982
and hovered around $3,000 per hectare through
1985, despite falling net farm incomes. In real
terms, farmland values are now less than half
the values attained in 1982. The real net worth
of sheep and beef farms declined even further,
from an index high of 1,423 in 1981 to only
430 in 1989, a decline of 70%.
Agricultural sector debt more than doubled
in the first five years of the 1980s and contin-
ued to rise in the first several years following
the initiation of the new economic policies.
Net debt repayment is thought to have reduced
debt in the last several years, but it is clear that
the burden of debt is substantial and liquidity
low throughout much of the agricultural sector
(Johnston and Sandrey 1990; Johnston and
Frengley).
Changes in Livestock Numbers and
Land Values
Changes in policy have altered the environ-
ment for New Zealand agriculture in each of
the past three decades. In table 2, we provide
some insights into the effects on livestock
numbers and land values by comparisons for
representative years: (a) 1965-67, post-ADC
target-setting years; (b) 1975-77, years im-
mediately preceding the introduction of the
supplementary minimum prices; (c) 1982-84,
the last three years prior to initiation of the
new policies of economic liberalization; and
(d) 1987-89, the most recent years for which
we have reliable livestock and land value in-
formation.
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Table 2. Pastoral Farm Livestock Numbers, Farmland Values, and Interest Rates
Post-ADC Most Recent
Target Years Pre-SMP Years Last SMP Years Years
(1965-67) (1975-77) (1982-84) (1987-89)
Average Livestock Numbers (million head)
Total Sheep 57.4 59.5 70.1 63.3
Beef Cattle 3.9 6.1 4.6 4.7
Dairy Cattle 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.2
Deer n/a 0.015 0.20 0.61
Goats n/a n/a 0.16 1.33
Total Stock Unitsa 84.8 98.8 104.8 101.2
Freehold Farmland Sales
Number of Farms 3,480 4,044 3,506 2,506
Price per Hectare
Nominal ($/ha) n/a 828 2,692 2,548
Real (1976 $/ha) n/a 815 1,057 558
Mortgage Interest Rates
Commercial Lender Rates
Nominal (%) n/a 8.9 14.6 17.9b
Real (%) n/a -6.5 -6.4 6.85b
Rural Bank Interest Rates
Nominal (%) n/a 7.3 9.0 17.5 b
Sources: Sandrey and Reynolds; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; Valuation New Zealand; Johnston and Sandrey (1990).
Note: n/a = not available.
a In New Zealand a stock unit is equivalent to an adult ewe sheep. Other types and ages of livestock are assigned stock unit equivalents
which may range from a low of 0.4 of a stock unit for goats less than one year in age to 6 stock units for an adult cow.
b 1987-88 only.
Pre-1984 policies consistently sought ex-
pansion of pastoral agriculture livestock num-
bers and investments in agriculture. Financial
assistance supported product prices and sub-
sidized input costs. Table 2, thus, shows in-
vestment responses to assistance policies and
post-1984 adjustments to their removal.
Stock Numbers
Changes in stock numbers on pastoral farms
reflect farmer perceptions of optimal stocking
rates, given current and expected economic and
climatic conditions. Total numbers of sheep
increased only moderately after the ADC tar-
get setting, but the introduction of the SMP
scheme, coupled with land development pol-
icies, spurred significant growth in sheep num-
bers, from 59.5 million in the pre-SMP years
to an average of 70.1 million in 1982-84. Sheep
numbers have since declined, approaching the
pre-SMP level, 5 with some of the decline be-
cause of recent droughts in several production
areas.
5 The 1989 inventory was slightly less than 61.2 million (Reyn-
olds and SriRamaratnam).
Beef cattle increased in number in the early
to mid-1970s and then went into decline as
sheep became more profitable. Through the
loss of relative profitability and the effect of a
major drought in autumn 1983, beef cattle de-
clined from 6.1 million in 1975-77 to only 4.6
million head in the last SMP years, 1982-84.
The expansion since has been modest, affected
also by a second major drought of the decade
in autumn 1989.
Dairy cattle numbers have fluctuated over
the last two decades in the rather narrow range
from 2.9 to 3.4 million head. Producer re-
sponse to the increased profitability for 1989
and 1990 was limited by lagged replacement
rates and by the loss of prime North Island
areas to horticultural expansion. Some dairy-
ing moved to irrigated farms and high fertility
pastoral properties, displacing sheep and beef.
While the change in dairy numbers was small,
the short-term more favorable profit outlook
did induce higher productivity per animal and
increased volumes of production.6
6 Dairy prices have since fallen to near the levels reported for
much of the 1985-88 production years.
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Deer and goats, both substitutes for sheep
and cattle, have increased significantly. Deer
farming did not start until the mid 1960s (goat
farming later), although feral animals have long
been present in New Zealand. Numbers have
risen twenty fold since 1980, but are still com-
paratively small in total. Deer are more capital
intensive than sheep or beef cattle and this
slows expansion. Stock availability also may
have been a limiting factor. Capital inputs for
goats are comparable to those for sheep, and
their numbers have expanded rapidly due, in
part, to the removal of weed control assistance.
Because deer are particularly profitable and
goats are required for weed control on more
farms, their numbers may continue to expand.
In aggregate, stock numbers and pastoral
output were sustained by the assistance mea-
sures through the early 1980s against increas-
ingly disadvantageous economic conditions of
rising costs and falling commodity prices. Stock
numbers increased from 84.8 million in the
post-ADC target years (1965-67) to nearly 100
million in the 1975-77 (pre-SMP) period. Stock
numbers then rose marginally to 104.8 million
for the 1982-84 period and have since fallen,
largely reflecting the reduced sheep numbers.
The reestablishment of more normal weath-
er patterns may raise stock numbers some-
what, but reduced production on many sheep
and beef farms makes it difficult to service the
debt incurred by borrowings under conditions
in which financial decisions were distorted by
assistance policies. The short-term upturn in
dairy product prices lent encouragement to in-
vestment in dairying. However, it is arguable
that the pastoral sector has been more disad-
vantaged by the on-going debt attributable to
the encouragement created by the assistance
than if the assistance had not been granted at
all.
Farmland Values
Land prices are affected by changes in product
prices, production costs, interest rates, farm-
ers' expectations of future economic condi-
tions, and the political economy. The land
market was influenced by the milieu of assis-
tance policies affecting the sector.
The volumes of sales and their price levels
are both indicators which reflect changes. The
averages reported in table 2 mask even sharper
year-to-year variation,7 but the downward
7 For example, over the period 1970-87, sales of freehold farm-
land sold on the open market ranged between a low of 1,928 sales
trend in transactions is clearly evident. The
number of farms sold, which averaged over
4,000 per year during the 1970s, peaked at
5,230 during the 1982 season and then fell
significantly as active buyers retreated from
the market.
The nominal value of land prices climbed
throughout the seventies, accelerated through
1981-82 and 1982-83, and began to fall with
the reality of removed financial assistance. In
table 2, pre- (1975-77) and last (1982-84) SMP
nominal values increased three fold over the
period of comparison. Except for one year
(1985-86), land values have fallen since de-
regulation, although there is recent evidence
that continued decline in price has likely been
arrested. In real terms, the value of pastoral
farmland has declined by nearly half from lev-
els last associated with assistance efforts, in the
final SMP years, 1982-84.
A long-standing tool for sector expansion
had been differential interest rates charged for
commercial and agricultural loans. Compari-
sons of nominal rates show that the differential
spread between commercial and Rural Bank
nominal rates increased from an average of
1.6% in the pre-SMP years (1975-77) to an
average of 5.6% in the last SMP years (1982-
84). Real rates of interest were negative for all
of the period of rapid land price escalation,
1972-82 (Johnston and Sandrey 1990), aver-
aging about -6.5% in both the 1975-77 and
1982-84 periods (table 2). More recently, in-
terest rates are essentially equivalent for com-
mercial and agricultural loans, and the real rates
are positive.8 All loans are now made at com-
mercial rates, dampening immediate prospects
for farmland value increases and/or substan-
tial increases in the number of farms pur-
chased.
Financial Performance of New Zealand's
Sheep and Beef Farms
The New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards'
Economic Service (NZMWBES) provides a
consistent data base which can be used to eval-
uate the physical and economic performance
in 1986 and a high of 6,632 in 1973. The variation in sales activity
was thus about 50% above and below the average number of about
4,000 sales per year (Johnston and Sandrey 1990).
8 From 1985, concessional interest rates provided by the Rural
Bank were progressively increased by one percentage point per
annum to the market rate of interest, adding to the liquidity prob-
lems of farmers who had earlier, under more favorable conditions,
borrowed for farm development.
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Table 3. Selected Financial Measures of Weighted Average All Classes Sheep and Beef Farms
Pre-SMP Last Most Recent
Years SMP Years Years
Financial Measures Unit (1975-77) (1982-84) (1988-90)
Gross Farm Income ($1,000) 40 102 128
Total Farm Expenditures ($1,000) 27 81 99
Interest Expense ($1,000) 3 14 23
Net Farm Income ($1,000) 13 21 28
Real Net Farm Income Index (1976 = 1,000) 916 618 449
Total Assets ($1,000) 296 843 644
Fixed Liabilities ($1,000) 50 124 136
Net Worth ($1,000) 232 688 466
Real Net Worth Index (1976 = 1,000) 1,011 1,205 441
Consumer Price Index (1976 = 1,000) 1,003 2,526 4,643
Sources: New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service (various issues of the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey,
1989, 1990b); Taylor. A complete table containing annual observations for the 1970-71 through 1989-90 production seasons is reported
in Johnston and Frengley.
of New Zealand sheep and beef farms. Selected
economic information is contained in table 3.
We use the Boards' representative weighted
average "All Classes" sheep and beef farm
comparisons for three periods: (a) pre-SMP
years, 1975-77; (b) last SMP years, 1982-84;
and (c) most recent years, 1988-90. All dollar
entries are in current New Zealand dollars.
The first five rows summarize aspects of the
annual income and expenditure flows. Both
gross farm incomes and total farm expendi-
tures increased substantially over the SMP pe-
riod. Gross farm incomes reached their peak
in the 1984-85 production year because of de-
valuation and favorable commodity markets,
then fell by 20% in the following year (1985-
86). Despite gradual improvement, it has yet
to attain its peak amount in nominal terms,
even though the 1988-90 average is higher than
for the 1982-84 period.
A large and increasing component of total
farm expenditures has been annual interest ex-
pense, which increased sharply between the
first two periods and has continued to rise since,
although the annual level of interest expense
fell somewhat in 1989 and 1990, because of
debt reduction and lower interest rates.
Net farm incomes in NZMWBES accounts
are after interest payments but before draw-
ings, taxation payments, and principal repay-
ments. In nominal terms, average net farm in-
comes of sheep and beef farms rose for each
of the three periods. However, the index of
real net farm incomes reveals that the real net
income position of farms dropped substan-
tially over the decade of the 1980s, falling by
nearly half since the last SMP years.
The next four rows pertain to the capital
structure of New Zealand livestock farms. To-
tal assets rose nearly three fold between pre-
and last SMP years and then fell sharply. Fixed
liabilities, or long-term debt, have increased,
though more slowly since 1982-84. Livestock
farms have been working their way out of the
massive burden of long-term debt and have
reduced it by about 10% since the 1985-86
production season (Johnston and Frengley). 9
The net worth position of New Zealand sheep
and beef farms increased through 1983-84 and
then fell precipitously after the 1984-85 year,
reflecting the sharp fall in farm real estate and
livestock values. The real net worth of farm
units which had been relatively stable for most
of the 1970s, fell by nearly two-thirds from
the last SMP (1982-84) level, though a slight
(6%) recovery is now projected for 1990
(NZMWBES 1990b).
Rows 5 and 9 show how the two important
income and net worth indices have changed
over the past two decades. Real net farm in-
comes showed weakness in the late 1970s,
whereas the declines in real net worth were a
much later occurrence. The index of real net
farm incomes was, on average, very favorable
to New Zealand sheep and beef farms during
the 1970s, but as incomes fell, farmers in-
creased farm indebtedness to service financial
obligations. Subsequent reductions in net worth
followed shortly thereafter. The index of real
net worth fell below its base year (1976) level
following the 1983-84 year, even though the
1982-84 "last SMP years" average was 20%
9 Changes in land values and rural debt outcomes resulting from
a sharp decapitalization of land assets since 1984 are analyzed in
detail by Johnston and Sandrey (1990).
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Table 4. Selected Financial Performance Indicators, New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farms,
1984-88
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Average Sheep and Beef Farm:
Net Worth Ratio 80 77 69 72 71
Interest as a Percent of Gross Farm Income 16 13 20 19 19
Cash Surplusa -$7,048 $4,416 -$15,732 -$7,169 -$13,463
High Debt Farms (<50% equity):
Percent of Farms 6 10 24 19 20
Net Worth Ratio 35 32 24 27 25
Interest as a Percent of Gross Farm Income 36 30 41 42 38
Cash Surplus a -$15,672 -$12,089 -$42,833 -$30,729 -$35,121
Source: New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service (1988a, 1989, 1990a).
a Net income plus depreciation less drawings and tax and principal payments.
higher than the 1976 base. Fixed liabilities for
the sector rose from about $91,000 per farm
in 1980-81 to $148,000 in 1985-86, an in-
crease of 63% during a period of sharply falling
real net farm incomes (Johnston and Frengley).
Both real indices are now less than half of base-
year levels, and the average real net worth per
farm is only about a third of its value at the
start of this decade.
Economic Well-Being of New Zealand Farms
Table 4 presents economic performance in-
dicators for the pastoral sector. For sheep and
beef farms, there was only one year in the last
five in which there was a positive cash surplus
before borrowing.s Returns for the 1985 farm-
ing year were buoyed by very good climatic
conditions and the short-term effects of de-
valuation. Negative cash surpluses, before bor-
rowing, have occurred since. Interest expense
has increased to about 20% of gross income.
Average equity, which was 80% in 1984, has
not recovered much beyond the 69% level re-
corded in 1986.
The bottom portion of table 4 refers to "High
Debt" farms, defined as farms with 50% or
less equity. The proportion of high debt sheep
and beef farms rose substantially over the pe-
riod from only 6% in 1984 to about 24% in
1986. The subsequent fall to about 20% is like-
ly attributable to forced farm sales. The net
'
0The New Zealand farm accounts define "cash surplus" as net
income plus depreciation less drawings and tax and principal pay-
ments. The inclusion of noncash depreciation clouds the severity
of recent financial conditions.
worth ratio for high debt farms has fallen from
35% average equity in 1984 to only 25%. In-
debtedness now amounts to three-quarters of
the value of total farm assets of high debt sheep
and beef farms.
In 1985 there were no farms reporting less
than 10% equity, but by 1987 about 10% of
high debt farms, equivalent to about 2% of all
sheep and beef farms, had zero or negative
equities (NZMWBES 1988b). "High debt"
sheep and beef farms have had to direct about
40% of their gross receipts to pay annual in-
terest expenses. Negative cash surpluses have
been associated with this subcategory of farms,
most recently at levels of -$30,000 or more
per year, a level not sustainable for the long
run.
There are differences between economic
conditions in the various regions of New Zea-
land. Particularly hard hit are farms in regions
which have simultaneously had to cope with
economic policy reform and with drought. A
recent Rural Bank study of the financial con-
dition of its customers in North Otago re-
vealed that 18% of farm units there had neg-
ative equities in November 1988 (Chappell).
And within regions, there is substantial vari-
ability in farm performance and financial con-
ditions among farms. In a recent paper ana-
lyzing the economic performance of farms in
a North Island farming region, Taylor noted
that the top 15% of farms were highly profit-
able with a 10% return on equity capital, the
bottom 15% were clearly unsustainable as vi-
able farm units for the long term having a
-1.5% return on equity, and the farms in the
middle were faced with debt levels which had
forced changes in expenditures that could po-
tentially adversely affect long-term viability.
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Overall, a significant betterment in the fi-
nancial performance and condition of New
Zealand sheep and beef farms is not yet evi-
dent, although recently there has been an up-
ward revision in the 1988-89 cash surplus es-
timate to only -$3,700 (NZMWBES 1990a).
Interest payments dominate the decisions of
those heavily in debt, and concern has been
expressed about the longer-term impacts of
lower levels of inputs on future productivity
and, thus, enhanced farm incomes. While we
would expect lower levels of fertilizer appli-
cation in the absence of input and commodity
subsidies, the recent period of low real incomes
has been described as one in which investment
in agriculture has been below maintenance
(Taylor). In particular, there has been low
spending on repairs and maintenance and on
fertilizer, with farmers relying on residual soil
phosphate reserves in the short run.
Other sectors of New Zealand's agricultural
economy have, understandably, also been un-
der financial stress because of terminated fi-
nancial assistance, reduced income, and in-
creased debt. The kiwifruit industry, which
expanded during the 1970s and early 1980s is,
like the sheepmeat sector, burdened with prob-
lems. A November 1987 survey revealed that
35% of growers had less than 50% equity and
that about 8% had negative equities (Moore
and Sandrey). The North Otago study revealed
that cash crop farms in that area had an av-
erage equity of only 4%, in contrast to an av-
erage of 35% for sheep farms (Chappell). Both
horticultural and arable crop farms also had
been targeted for expansion by pre-1984 as-
sistance policies, and have been affected by the
shift in policy.
In contrast, there also has been moderate to
strong growth in beef, deer, goats, and finewool
sheep production in contrast to retrenchments
in crossbred sheep farming and static kiwifruit
and apple plantings (MAF). The dairy sector
has been one in which there had been widely
reported price recovery, but world prices for
dairy products have since fallen somewhat,
dampening further growth in that sector.
Summary and Review of Sectoral
Adjustment
For portions of two decades, market signals
affecting management and investment deci-
sions of New Zealand farmers were influenced
by deliberate government intervention. With
price supports on products, and costs offset by
a variety of supplements, optimal financial de-
cisions by farmers were significantly distorted,
resulting in exaggerated output and excessive
resource use.
With the reversal of previous policies and
the commencement of the return to internal
free market conditions, problems created by
the short-run nature of assistance policies soon
became apparent. Farmers who had responded
to distorted price signals and had miscalculat-
ed long-run risks associated with assistance
policies (by using borrowed funds to increase
output or expand farm holdings at inflated land
prices) were caught, and the inexorable on-
slaught of reversed financial leverage com-
menced. Incomes collapsed and debt servicing
costs rose.
It is impossible to estimate, in the aggregate
and over all farm types, just how many farm
units are now or are for the longer term "non-
viable." A Reserve Bank of New Zealand as-
sessment of the magnitude of likely adjust-
ments noted that about 10% of all farmers were
in a critical financial position and that an ad-
ditional 30%, largely involved in traditional
pastoral farming or in horticultural operations,
would have difficulty surviving unless market
conditions improved in the following three
years. The recent occurrence of adverse cli-
matic events have made even more harsh the
realities of restructuring the agricultural sector
from one of directed assistance to one with a
dominant market orientation. While there has
been price recovery in the dairy industry and
individual, well-managed and relatively debt-
free sheep and beef farming units have been
profitable, continued high interest rates, ad-
verse exchange rates, commodity prices, and
climatic events have taken a heavy toll on the
rural sector.
Thus, the legacy of the readjustment re-
mains. Sheep and beef farmers carrying resid-
ual debt are in a precarious position. Nominal
and real incomes have improved from the de-
spair of 1985-86, but elevated interest rates
and inadequate incomes particularly threaten
the survival of one-fifth of all sheep and beef
farms with small or negative equities. Negative
cash surpluses adversely affect many firms. Six
years after the return to market conditions be-
gan, insolvent firms continue to farm. The fi-
nancial problems of the most severely indebt-
ed firms have now shifted from the borrowers
to the lenders whose investment is at risk. Ag-
ricultural support services and processing
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plants also have been affected by closure, and
rural townships have been severely threatened
by business closure and depopulation.
Worse, the intergeneration effect has been
especially severe. Young and new farmers who
bought farms between 1977 and 1983 and who
borrowed heavily at that time have been most
seriously affected as a group. Many have be-
come insolvent. In addition, those who pro-
vided seller financing have seen their financial
plants altered. In particular, intrafamily inter-
generational transfers have been stressed be-
cause asset-based retirement security has col-
lapsed for many. The average age of farmers
has increased as fewer new farmers enter the
industry. Interest in traditional, vocation-ori-
ented agricultural education has declined and
some training institutions have closed.
The major uncertainties, beyond those of
commodity markets and prices, concern gov-
ernmental monetary and fiscal policies influ-
encing interest and exchange rates and possible
changes in the reluctance of creditors to initiate
actions against problem loans. The future must
include restructuring of many farms to either
rid them of excessive debt or to transfer own-
erships to new hands at lower levels of in-
vestment to foster the emergence of appropri-
ately sized, economically efficient production
units more capable of responding to markets.
The New Zealanders' "She'll be right" at-
titude will not hold without energetic efforts
within the rural sector and among financial
institutions. Sharply reduced land values may
permit new entrants to be lower cost, efficient
producers if they are given prudent financial
and managerial guidance. More prudent bank-
ing practices are sure to emerge from the les-
sons of the 1980s with less multisource or non-
restricted financing and more competitive
pressure in financial markets.
Conclusion
There are few equivalent examples of sudden
termination of government assistance policies.
The New Zealand decision was to abruptly
sever and to eradicate the inexorably entwined
set of public assistance policies. Adjustment
assistance has been minimal for the rural sec-
tor.
The speed and extent to which the multitude
of adjustment challenges are met is of extreme
importance in creating the economically via-
ble, efficient agriculture envisaged for the 1990s
by the architects of New Zealand's economic
deregulation. The New Zealand position has
been that its unilateral disarmament of subsidy
policies will make the country better able to
competitively take advantage of liberalized
trade prospects in a world of fewer distortions.
We can only wait to see if the agricultural sec-
tor will bear fruit commensurate with the ag-
onizingly slow adjustment to the new policy
environment. The fact that the transition has
neither been instantaneous nor painless should
be readily evident to even the most casual ob-
server.
[Received April 1990; final revision
received January 1991.]
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